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Abstract
Brian O’Nolan, writer and civil servant, wanted the Irish to explore alter-
native realities and build a new country. He unsettled taken-for-granted 
relationships between words and things, and used storytelling devices 
to engage his readers. However, once his status had been achieved, he 
profited from his ‘specific weight’ in society to launch deeper attacks 
on conventional beliefs. As a comic writer, he had the duty to criticise 
society even at the risk of losing benefits. As Bakhtin noted, inertia is 
maybe the worst social threat. In this respect, comic figures function as 
actors of solidarity, and keepers of a “culture in common”, in Raymond 
Williams’s words. Brian O’Nolan the comic writer was a negotiator of 
change, offering a comfortable and distressing perspective, but in the 
end not as harmful as that of the ruling class. He let us peep into parallel 
worlds for the improvement of our understanding of things.
Keywords: Brian O’Nolan, Cruiskeen Lawn, Flann O’Brien, Hu-
mour, Journalism
1. Introduction
Conspirator is a nice word carrying negative meanings with it. If we 
trace back its origins, as Brian O’Nolan himself often loved to do, we might 
see with some surprise that it meant quite the opposite of today’s usage. In 
effect, a conspirator (or conspirer) is ‘one who conspires’. According to the 
OED, to conspire means
[a. F. conspire-r (15th c. in Littré) (= Pr. cospirar, Sp. conspirar, It. conspirare), ad. 
L. conspīrāre lit. “to breathe together”, whence, “to accord, harmonize, agree, combine 
or unite in a purpose, plot mischief together secretly”.]
intr. To combine privily for an evil or unlawful purpose; to agree together to do 
something criminal, illegal, or reprehensible (esp. to commit treason or murder, excite 
sedition, etc.); to plot. Const. with, against, to do something. (OED 2009, “Conspire, v.”)
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Of course, now it means what we all think it means. But originally, to 
conspire meant ‘to breathe together’, to be in agreement, which is exactly 
what my reading of Brian O’Nolan’s works aims to show. Breathing together 
with his public, feeling the general sentiment and trying to educate people, 
in sum, is what I think he did in all his years as a writer and journalist en-
gaged in Ireland’s public life.
By using different pen names, styles and techniques, what he managed 
to do was offer the Irish Plain People different points of view, possibilities of 
reality, or whole alternative worlds to look at and take inspiration from – fresh 
breaths, indeed – to drive the stagnant, suffocating and at times staunching 
cultural atmosphere to a new paradigm: a culture in common for an Ireland 
united and possibly reconciled.
Brian O’Nolan chose to write under many pen names, or personas, to 
whom what Declan Kiberd said of the characters in James Joyce’s Ulysses very 
well applies: “… in re-enacting the roles of Telemachus and Odysseus, these 
characters remind us of what peoples have in common across the ages, there-
by achieving one of the basic purposes of art, making man feel less alone” 
(Kiberd 1992, xxix). And of its author: “Joyce believed that a writer’s first 
duty might be to insult rather than to flatter national vanity” (ibidem, xiii).
Writing as Myles na gCopaleen in his “Cruiskeen Lawn” column in the 
Irish Times, Brian O’Nolan talks of himself in similar terms: “I sometimes 
flatter myself that I am a most valuable person (or public institution) because 
I ventilate certain disquiets and resentments widely held, but mostly by peo-
ple who have no means of public expression” (O’Nolan 1956).
Who was he, then? More than an author, he was certainly a comic fig-
ure, since his many personas allowed him to express a variety of points of 
view in different styles and different media, all linked together by a humor-
ous bloodline. For this reason, he could reach a wider audience than that of 
a writer like Joyce, who was of course known but could not compete with 
the scale of a newspaper readership. Thus, he kept in contact with his public 
for 26 years (from 1940 to 1966, when he died) and influenced their views. 
To understand how and why he managed to do this, i.e. the ways in which 
he used humour to trigger social change, we first need a precise definition of 
humour and humorous writer.
2. Exploring alternative realities through laughter
Humour is quite easy to understand at face value. Actually, humour is 
one of the few things all human beings really have in common, as it regu-
lates the threshold between the physical and the spiritual. We understand a 
verbal or non-verbal situation, and we show our reaction through smile and 
laughter – or frowning, if we disapprove of it. It is almost depressing to list 
the philosophers, writers and scientists who addressed the nature of humour 
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and laughter, the list itself being proof of how widely debated (and debatable) 
the definition of humour is.
Some of these definitions are today considered out of date or simply sur-
passed by acquired scientific evidence: one example is Bergson, who main-
tained that we perceive humour, and then laugh, only when we feel superior 
to others. Nevertheless, hidden in the past, there are also some valuable items 
still useful for our understanding. In ancient Greece, for example, laughter 
had a fundamental role in religion. Laughing was a sacred, key process in the 
rites of Dionysius, where the komos – the delirious crowd attending the cer-
emonies – reached a collective ekstasis and breached all rules governing body 
and mind. Ekstasis does in fact mean exactly ‘to stand out’ of the limited, 
corporeal body and seek contact with the divine element. Therefore, laugh-
ing and laughter were the privileged means of letting the earthly body into 
communion with the extra-terrestrial element. It was considered divine be-
cause of its mysterious nature, and like all things divine it was revered and 
respected. During the rites, comedy plays were performed where the actors 
sought to bring all the audience to this ecstasy of divine union using hu-
mour and laughter:
As to the mood in which the drama was performed it was one of Dionysian 
ecstasy and dithyrambic rapture. The player, withdrawn from the ordinary world 
by the mask he wore, felt himself transformed into another ego which he did not so 
much represent as incarnate and actualize. The audience was swept along with him 
into that state of mind. (Huizinga 1955 [1944], 145)
Johan Huizinga, the great Dutch anthropologist, in his justly famous 
study on play, Homo Ludens (1955 [1944]), frequently links the states of mind 
in play and humour. Nietzsche, in his work on the birth of tragedy, reminds 
us that, contrary to what we might intuitively think today, comedy was born 
first in the humus of Dionysian stage contests. Tragedy arose later, as a sort 
of counterbalance to a practice that seemed to get out of control to the then 
regulators (Nietzsche 1993 [1872]). This view on humour passed almost un-
touched from the Greeks down to the Romans, who were great admirers of 
Greek culture and exported its values throughout their empire.
The advent of Christianity in Europe brought about a reconsideration 
of humour as a fundamentally sinful attitude, and today’s perception of it 
is still influenced by this view, at least in the countries where Christianity is 
still deep-rooted. If laughing at gods in a polytheistic pantheon was permit-
ted and somehow due, now laughing at an all-powerful, single God became 
forbidden. If anything, for at least a logical reason: any act of communica-
tion is an act of knowledge and needs more than one player to be enacted. 
But if the new God is omnipresent and all-encompassing, there is no possi-
bility of new knowledge because he knows everything and does not need a 
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second party to enact a communicative play. The ancient Greek and Roman 
gods laughed, but the one God does not laugh because he is never surprised 
by anything, so why should we be? In the Middle Ages, continental Europe 
passed on and reinforced this principle thanks to the strong links between 
Christianity and the (Roman and then Holy Roman) Empire.
Ireland was an exception, as often happens: in the fifth and sixth centu-
ries AD, Saint Patrick christianised the island and founded many monaster-
ies, but took great care not to admit Ireland to the territories of the Empire 
or the Papacy. Irish monasteries, under the more relaxed rule of local kings – 
some of them even setting up their residences in the very monasteries – were 
thus allowed to flourish and Irish monks turned to saving ancient texts from 
complete oblivion by copying them. The distance from the bloody wars and 
invasions that the Continent saw in those turbulent centuries, up until the 
ninth century at least, provided a relative peace and prosperous mingling of 
old pagan traditions and new Christian ideals. The good relations and col-
laboration between kings and monks, together with the distance from strict 
authorities like the emperor and the Pope, might well be what permitted the 
ancient tradition of pagan humour to survive the Middle Ages in the Irish 
texts that came from one of Europe’s oldest written literatures. Vivian Mer-
cier devoted a whole study to this entitled The Irish Comic Tradition (1962), 
linking the perhaps over mythicized Irish Middle Ages with the existence 
and persistence of modern Irish spirit and humour.
Some centuries later, Humanism and the Renaissance in Italy and after-
wards in Europe brought man and the human disciplines back to the centre: 
humour was revalued and employed in the arts, albeit as a side dish, rather 
than a main course, so to say. A debate in modern, scientific terms on the 
principles of humour only started in the seventeenth century with Hobbes, 
who in his treatises On Human Nature and De Corpore Politico (1994 [1640]) 
and The Leviathan (2008 [1651]) said more or less what Bergson was still say-
ing at the beginning of the twentieth century: we laugh because we feel su-
perior, fundamentally equalling humour with aggressiveness. Later on, other 
thinkers started to focus on its psychological aspects: the eighteenth century 
Irish philosopher, Francis Hutcheson, in “Reflections Upon Laughter” (1973 
[1725]), was the first to introduce the concept of incongruity, still at the basis 
of today’s mainstream theories of humour. In his opinion, laughter is noth-
ing but human response to the external stimuli that are perceived as incon-
gruous, therefore not interpretable according to our existing mental schemes.
A century later, Herbert Spencer, in his “Physiology of Laughter” (2017 
[1860]), maintained that the ‘energy’ running through our nervous system 
always tends to generate a muscular movement proportional to the inten-
sity of the emotions felt. When the tension reaches a peak that cannot be 
endured by our muscles alone, we use laughter as an outlet of this surplus 
energy. And this peak takes place, he says, “when consciousness is unawares 
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transferred from great things to small” (cited in Koestler 1975, 55). Though 
incomplete, it is one of the most satisfactory theories so far on the origins of 
laughter, since it gives a working definition of the foggy threshold between 
humour and laughter.
Freud was the one who placed the next tile in the puzzle. Even though 
he only wrote on wit and not on general humour, devoting to the former 
his famous essay entitled The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious (Freud 
2002 [1905]), he spent some words on humour in general. He maintained 
that humour was something out of one’s control, unintentional, while wit was 
an act of will in view of a specific purpose. Wit, for Freud, is the open-eye 
equivalent of dream, insofar as it operates to circumvent taboos and prohi-
bitions and let tensions out. In a controlled context – jokes normally taking 
place in conventional, socially accepted places and situations – and through 
wit, one can let inner taboo contents out without activating Super-Ego cen-
sorship. He was then the first to establish a key principle: humour is a social 
activity and involves aspects of social regulation such as inclusion, exclusion, 
and bond enforcement.
If humour is not so much a literary device as a social practice with some 
standardised codifications in literature, some ideas from anthropological and 
sociological research can be included to clarify the limits of our subjects.
Fabio Ceccarelli is an anthropologist who wrote extensively on chim-
panzee societies. In his biosocial study Sorriso e riso (Ceccarelli 1988; Smile 
and laughter), he demonstrates that laughter is used among chimpanzees to 
mark the inclusion in, or the exclusion from, the elite group. Basically, it is a 
conventional badge of membership. He argues that human societies are also 
organized in circles, that elite circles are recognized and institutionalized in 
all types of societies, and that the pressure to be included in them is a com-
mon social phenomenon. Laughter, then, is meant as a unifying signal that 
corroborates bonds within an elite and decrees the exclusion from the same 
elite of those who are laughed at and do not laugh together. This is the first 
known study to me that proposes a link between laughter, culture and so-
ciety. Because being part of the same group means also to share the group’s 
values and customs or, in other words, culture.
I think it is now quite clear where I am heading. Humour being a sub-
ject where so many giants of human thought failed, I think that the only 
way to deal with it, and thus understand more deeply what the humourist’s 
motives are, is to cross some boundaries and go and search for connections 
with other disciplines that can illuminate this phenomenon. All scholars agree 
that humour fiercely resists categorizations in single slots or disciplines, be 
they biology, culture, or society. I think that what we call humour, for lack 
of better definitions, is a complex process involving many areas of life that 
we distinctly recognize and appreciate, but that we invariably fail to describe 
when they blend.
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Research about humour is ripe today – there is even a dedicated quarter-
ly, Humor, published by the International Society of Humor Studies – with 
theorists who devote their investigations almost exclusively to it. However, in 
many cases their research concentrates in psychology and the neurosciences 
and aims at finding which brain area is activated by which ‘kind’ of humour 
(or “scripts”, as Attardo and Raskin call them; see Raskin 1985; Attardo 2001). 
This, of course, is still very useful for the literary critic and the social scien-
tist because it helps to better define the terms of the question, but it does not 
yield directly usable tools for analysing texts and bodies of work. In some 
respects, we find ourselves more or less the way Huizinga put it:
All the terms in this loosely connected group of ideas — play, laughter, folly, 
wit, jest, joke, the comic, etc. — share the characteristic which we had to attrib-
ute to play, namely that of resisting any attempt to reduce it to other terms. Their 
rationale and their mutual relationship must lie in a very deep layer of our mental 
being. (1955, 6)
In my search for a usable framework to apply to Brian O’Nolan’s case 
study, I found some very interesting points in the works of three scholars that 
helped me better define humour and the humourist. 
The first is Arthur Koestler. Born in Budapest in 1905 from a Jewish 
family of mixed Russian-Hungarian origins, he studied engineering at the 
Polytechnic in Vienna but left his studies to follow the Zionist project in 
Palestine in 1926. He eventually turned to journalism and earned his living 
from writing. He published novels, autobiographical works, and many non-
fiction writings on such diverse subjects as the history of science, the para-
normal, ethnography, Judaism, and most of all politics. Maybe only a man 
of such wide views on human knowledge could write a book like The Act of 
Creation (Koestler 1975).
In this unconventional essay, Koestler upholds creation as a human cog-
nitive process that can take place in many fields. He examines the cases of 
the jester, the scientist and the artist. All of them create by using the same 
mental process, that of bisociation, as he calls it. To bisociate means to asso-
ciate an idea to two different matrices, or mental patterns, normally not con-
nected. When we expect something but something else happens, we react 
by laughing (to jokes), crying (when we are desperate or, on the contrary, ex-
tremely happy), or standing in awe (when we experience a ‘eureka’ moment). 
In any case, it happens when we find out new connections in our knowledge. 
Physically, it might be compared to the creation of many new synapses be-
tween our neurons. He was the first author I found who associated humour 
directly with knowledge and broke off the traditionally disparaging, debas-
ing view that philosophers usually had. In effect, they used to assign it to 
the sphere of aesthetics, rather than knowledge, and, as it was considered in-
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variably ugly, its destiny was to be simply named and forgotten without any 
in-depth analysis on its nature.
Koestler uses a famous joke to illustrate a union of matrices:
Chamfort tells a story of a Marquis at the court of Louis XIV who, on enter-
ing his wife’s boudoir and finding her in the arms of a Bishop, walked calmly to the 
window and went through the motions of blessing the people in the street.
“What are you doing?” cried the anguished wife.
“Monseigneur is performing my functions”, replied the Marquis, “so I am per-
forming his”. (1975, 33)
Here we would expect a plausible outburst of rage on the part of the be-
trayed husband. Instead, he connects two behaviours in a new way. Of course, 
a joke can be read in many ways but conceiving it as a production of new 
knowledge through an unexpected connection (the improbable, but possible, 
role exchange) sheds new light on the role of these constructs in social life.
The second is Peter L. Berger, an Austrian sociologist naturalized Ameri-
can. Famous for his thesis that reality is a form of consciousness (also the title 
of a book of his), he produced towards the end of the 1990s an interesting 
study on laughter, Redeeming Laughter (Berger 1997), in which he rescued 
two concepts earlier formulated by the Austrian sociologist Alfred Schütz: 
“paramount reality” (1945, 533) and “finite provinces of meaning” (551). The 
first is what everybody considers the conventional reading of reality, the set of 
accepted norms. The second are, on the other hand, all other possible read-
ings and interpretations that might challenge taken-for-granted conventions. 
The first is soothing, reassuring, allowing for a tranquil flowing of everyday 
lives. The second are mostly subversive, rich in taboos and permanently revo-
lutionary, not exactly the best environment where to live everyday routines. 
Therefore, he contends, there is a constant fight between the two, with the 
paramount reality always defending its privileged status against the aggres-
sion of other possible realities. As we all experience in our lives, conventions 
cannot suppress the emergence of other ideas. Our praxis has then created 
this sort of ‘bubbles’, revolutionary sandboxes opened and closed by conven-
tional signs in which we can test these possibilities. This is the case of jokes 
(where taboos can be expressed), but also of theatre, film and fiction (where 
we can create entirely fictional worlds), of dreams, mystic ecstasies, and so 
on. We experience these finite provinces of meaning even many times a day, 
and this is not at all considered exceptional or schizophrenic but an integral 
part of our lives. It is in this very way that we can test ideas before buying 
them, and integrate them in a new paramount reality, different from the 
one we had before. It goes without saying that humour is the cheapest, most 
common and most sought-after way to experience these realities and, exactly 
for this reason, then again the preferred form of exploration and knowledge.
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The third is Robert R. Provine. An American psychologist and neuroscien-
tist who has studied laughter in social interaction for decades, he has drawn his 
own, original conclusions about its nature and functions. He thinks that laugh-
ter and smile are fundamentally social communication markers, but his most 
remarkable finding lies in my opinion in what he says about tickling. Though 
apparently an unimportant phenomenon, it is nonetheless revealing in that it 
demonstrates that laughing is not always (at least, not exclusively) linked to 
humour, and serves to prove that laughter is a social regulator, not differently 
from what Ceccarelli said about chimpanzees. We laugh when we are tickled, 
but only when the tickling comes from an accepted member of our circles. We 
do not accept tickling from strangers – as we do not accept sweets – because it 
represents a threat, rather than a pleasure. The conclusive proof seems to come 
from the self-tickling experience: normally, it does not work, and therefore we 
recognize that the stimulus comes from us and not from others. As a conse-
quence, he postulates a sort of ‘nonself detector’ that allows us to recognize 
when the stimulus comes from the outside, this way describing laughter as a 
marker associated with a positive relationship with others.
A theoretical remark on humour and laughter by Ceccarelli can finally 
lead to the next stage, about the translation of a humorous idea into practi-
cal action. Just as animals do, he says, we have some innate mechanisms of 
reaction to stimuli, and react even when we are not in the presence of a live 
stimulus but only a symbol of it, a decoy:
And when we talk of an Innate Unleashing Mechanism [such as laughter], we 
talk about the possibility of deceit through decoys. Furthermore, the human being 
is a “talking animal” and human language has the characteristic, empirically detect-
able, of being “reified”: a tendency exists, highlighted many a time, in human be-
ings so that it appears natural, at times incoercible, that they treat words, or better 
symbols in general, as they were “things” … For this reason, we can logically derive 
that decoys capable of triggering the IUM concerning the hierarchical order of hu-
man individuals, can also be symbols, i.e., “words”, “verbal constructions” such as, 
for example, communism and capitalism. (Ceccarelli 1988, 142; my translation)
3. Unsettling taken-for-granted worlds
We have seen that one of the tasks that is conventionally assigned to hu-
mour is that of exploring alternative realities and bringing them to life in the 
designated test areas of the finite provinces of meaning. If these possibilities of 
reality are any good, it is up to the public to tell and signal through the conven-
tional sign of laughter. Telling good jokes is a serious matter, but laughing, para-
doxically, is what marks the approbation of these ideas and not their dismissal.
Let us consider the jester, a figure omnipresent in the history of laugh-
ter. The court buffoon has always been the only one allowed to treat badly a 
divinely chosen king. But this had its advantages for the king himself: in a 
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court where he was often lied to for political and personal reasons, the jester 
was the only one who could tell him the blunt truth. It was then far more 
than a nostalgic remnant of time bygone; it was a key political function. It 
does not come as a surprise that the king who suppressed this office forever 
was the most autocratic king of all, Louis XIV of France. One who not only 
could not stand a joke, but also thought he was never wrong.
Jesters were the representatives of an authentic comic tradition: confined 
in an apparently uncomfortable role, they were able to tell the truth. In this 
case, again we can find a parallel with what Vivian Mercier said of the Irish: 
never in power, but ever mocking power. Maybe the poverty that marked so 
much of the history of Ireland, and the submission to its stronger neighbour, 
contributed to forge their national character as much as their pagan tradition 
of grotesque humour. This is quite difficult to demonstrate but also quite easy 
to tell, since all ethnic groups who suffered for long – I think of the Jews – 
have developed original means to survive in the most terrible situations, and 
a strong dose of humour was certainly not the weakest arrow in their quiver.
We are not used to treating jesters as central in literature, mostly because 
their performances were mainly oral and not usually recorded for posterity. 
However, they existed and certainly influenced other authors and writers of 
their times. Luckily, modern jesters today write, to leave at least a hint in writ-
ten words of what the power of words combined to action is. One of them 
even managed, for the first time in history, to be recognized as a canonical 
author: Dario Fo, the Italian playwright who was awarded the Nobel Prize 
in 1997 on the grounds that he “emulates the jesters of the Middle Ages in 
scourging authority and upholding the dignity of the downtrodden”. If we 
scroll the full speech introducing the Prize motivation, it is interesting to read 
at the end an unexpected Irish connection made by the Swedish Academy:
Looking backwards in time from Dario Fo, the ninety-fourth laureate for lit-
erature, to earlier writers given the award, it is tempting to arrest oneself at George 
Bernard Shaw, winner of the Prize seventy years ago. On that occasion the Swedish 
Academy emphasised the laureate’s idealism, humanity, and stimulating satire. The 
two writers are no doubt different from each other, but the same evaluative words 
can be applied to Dario Fo. (Frängsmyr 1998)
So “satire” and “scourging humour” have been finally recognized even by 
the solemnest academics as central in the fight for the “dignity of the down-
trodden”, thus sanctioning the strong link between humour and society, in-
tended as a group of actual individuals and not just an idealized readership. 
The same academics recognize at the beginning of the motivation document 
that “To be a jester is, and always has been, a serious matter” (ibidem).
As a self-appointed jester of the Republic, O’Nolan employed his full equip-
ment of techniques. The first and simplest was the unsettling of the taken for 
granted relationships between words and things. O’Nolan liked this trick, which 
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would go from simple bad puns to very elaborate situation comedies. In the Keats 
& Chapman series, the pun was central, as in the feat where the two writers go 
to France to stage Molière, Keats not agreeing with Chapman’s choices, though. 
Chapman’s scenery had to be freighted by barge on the Seine, but an accident oc-
curred and all his stuff sank in the river. Keats’s dry punch line on this was: “For 
once I admire your mise en Seine” (O’Brien 2005 [1976], 21). Other sketches see 
the two poets-turned-comedians, together or individually, in bizarre situations 
like this, combining more than one pun and non-sequitur references:
A Guinness.
Of course there is no drink [that] can compare with a bottle of stout. It is sui 
guinnessis. Keats once called a cab and was disgusted to find the beautiful upholstery 
ruined with milk spilt by some previous reveller who had been going home with 
it. Instead of crying over the spilt milk, Keats said to the cabman: “What’s this? A 
cabri-au-lait?”. (O’Brien 2005, 12)
Or this, imitating the Irish pronunciation of some words and opening 
an article in a fictional reprise of earlier conversations:
The language problem again – I am sorry, but we must, you know. First, pro-
nunciation; this is very important. … Dublin people are perhaps the worst offend-
ers in this respect. One thinks immediately of the words: “Cow”, “Man”, “Office”, 
“Foreign”, “It”, “This”, “Carry”, “Dog”, readers can finish the list (themselves). You 
know how they come out: “Kehaouw”, “Mhaaanhh”, “Uffuss”, “Phurren”, “Ihh”, 
“Dis”, “Korry”, “Dawg”… It is simply not good enough, that is all. The language 
will never progress if we make no effort to speak it properly. (O’Nolan 2000, 95)
However, this apparently innocent joking was just one layer of his mul-
tilevel game. He was not afraid of shifting to attacking politicians or other 
established figures, though at the same time he included play on words, es-
pecially on spellings, repetitions typical of oral storytelling, irony and even 
comic transliterations from the German (pronounced the Irish way, of course):
I, who have for so many centuries presided personally over the destinies of the 
very reverend the people of Ireland, cannot and will not pretend to be unmoved by 
the great news which from the grand mother country of Britain has just come to 
hand, bringing words of cheer and encouragement and abundant promise of good 
things in the daze to come to all good men who in this green clime dwell. There 
has been, it appears, there has been formed and established within the ranks of the 
Mother of Imperial Par (laments!), Co. Westminster, a little enclave, a few Jems set 
in that silver See, a small but select coterie, whose O’Vowed object it is, once and 
for all from the chain of the rt hon. the O’Pressor to emancip8 the gallant and in-
domitable company of the Royal Gaels, Southern Irish Divn. There has been set on 
Foote (Co. Dingle) a distinguished club, gathering within the esoteric circle of its 
élite all that is brightest and best in the British political harena, and holding always 
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in the most genuine O’Steam those pitiful nomadic hordes of displaced personnel 
which, Vorlach of Faub-Badenheim, we do not deem unfitting to denominate as the 
Irish, traditional and time-honoured fusiliers! (Some of them are still doing it – the 
others are marking it). (Ibidem, 144-145)
Engaging in such an activity – we agree with the Swedish Academy – 
means voicing the ideas and the whole cultural world of the many towards, 
and sometimes against, the established culture of the few, i.e., of the elites in 
command. This was the role O’Nolan took for his personas, but we could say 
also for himself: Carol Taaffe, in her Ireland Through the Looking Glass. Flann 
O’Brien, Myles na gCopaleen and Irish Cultural Debate, remarks that “his in-
consistency not only reflects the plain fact that his was not really a single (if 
a singular) voice, it also betrays Myles’s position, as Anthony Cronin saw it, 
as the licensed jester of the Dublin intelligentsia” (1990, 127).
This is only partly true, as Taaffe herself admits elsewhere. O’Nolan was 
certainly the scourge of Dublin, and Irish, intelligentsia, but also sought to 
alternate hefty, Latin-stuffed pieces with other popular themes such as The 
Brother or the Plain People of Ireland series. And, in se, all articles included 
the high and the low, as for example the many instances in which he explic-
itly used the (stet) and other marks indicating that a likely mistake is indeed 
correct because it is a play on words or an intended, usually bad, pun: “That 
mush (stet) at least is certain”, “demi-cracies (stet)” (O’Nolan 2000, 91), “The 
Abbey Theatre is a case in paint. (Yes – paint!)” (ibidem, 130) and “the Crok 
philosopher (stet)” (ibidem, 167). He even resorted to an asterisk on the title 
of a piece: “* An asterisk at the title of an article means, and will henceforth 
mean, that the article is absolutely true and that any incredible statement in 
it has been, where possible, verified” (O’Nolan 1989, 75). 
This idea of him as part of the intelligentsia but also holding a foot in 
plain people’s doors, connects to another ground-breaking concept introduced 
by Raymond Williams in his seminal work, Culture and Society 1780-1950 
(1982 [1958]), reaffirmed by Terry Eagleton in The Idea of Culture (2000). It 
is the concept of a culture in common, stressing the importance of negotiation 
between the culture of the elites, the exclusive culture including regulations 
and canons originating in the middle classes, and the culture of the masses, 
the inclusive culture of the people passed on through the generations and 
including traditions, superstitions, songs and the like.
One of the focal points in the building of a culture – and then of a na-
tion – is that culture is a convention in which elements are chosen rather 
than received, acritically and in bulk, from a mythical golden age in the past 
when they were all created once and for all. But who chooses them? Of course 
it is the elites, who always tended to exclude the products of popular litera-
ture and culture. But the people, as Bakhtin showed in his study on popular 
culture (1984), never passively accepted this and always fought back to keep 
GIORDANO VINTALORO272 
their traditions and at times also to speak up against rulers, as was the case 
of the Carnival period in the European Middle Ages. In this short yearly 
festive period before Lent and Easter, humour, subversion and the culture of 
the people took temporarily the power to mimic, or to test, what the world 
could be like if other ideas, other sets of values were really ruling. A proper 
finite province of meaning, in the very sense Alfred Schütz intended for these 
experiments in alternative realities.
Humour is certainly not the only means of negotiating between the 
culture of the elites and that of the masses; but it is one of the most power-
ful ones, since, as we have seen, it shares with art and science a fundamental 
mechanism of discovery and creation in an accepted testing environment. 
Maybe it does not actually work as Koestler postulates – neuroscientists are 
today working intensely on this, so we can expect more insights in the fu-
ture – but we can be positive enough that the basic procedure is that of the 
connection between two (or even more) matrices or patterns not previously 
associated. This would include the notion of incongruity, as eighteenth cen-
tury philosophers claimed, because there is no previous relation between the 
newly associated domains.
Afterwards, the idea that at first struck one as incongruous begins to 
work as actual possibility and, if the new association produces fruitful and 
viable inferences, what seemed laughable now becomes possible and eventu-
ally real. This would also explain why jokes, sketches and in general all hu-
morous performances work best only the first time we see or hear them, and 
why their effect wanes steadily with exposure: they are no longer new, but 
appropriated ideas already connected in our patterns, therefore not surpris-
ing and certainly not inspiring any new knowledge. Comic figures like Bri-
an O’Nolan, who managed to engage their audiences for a long time with 
a humour always different but always inspiring, faced a task more difficult 
than it looked. The use of many personas was certainly part of the strategy 
he decided to employ so as not to lose the grip on his public’s hearts. Taaffe 
again, speaking of The Third Policeman, notes that “The language of such 
times [the war years] has a certain affinity with nonsense, creating an alter-
native reality (however improbable) that can only be sustained on its own 
terms” (Taaffe 2008, 87).
This did not prevent him from making reference to real threats such as 
the atomic bomb, and to imagine comic situations in a tragically real con-
temporary setting. Just after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in 1945, 
the usual Keats & Chapman go to America and take their residence in a 
nuclear test area without knowing it. While Chapman is away on errands, 
Keats is hit by a prototype bomb that selectively blows people’s backs off, 
leaving them alive and with all organs in view and functioning. Chapman 
finds his friend in this condition and provides him with a cardboard back. 
But there is a surprise:
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Morning revealed another wonder. All the human backs blown off by the bomb 
were to be seen piled in a heap in a nearby field. Keats, still cursing loudly and vow-
ing vengeance on the bombers, insisted on stumbling in among the bleeding backs, 
surveying them carefully. Chapman took exception to the poet’s language.
“You mustn’t talk like that,” he remonstrated. “This is an outrage, but it is not 
for human agents to exact retribution. Vengeance is not for mortals. Please come 
away from this ghoulish repository of flesh…”
“I’m going to get my own back,” Keats said savagely, turning over nearby flesh-
es. (Quoted in O’Brien 2003, 174-175)
Along with George Bernard Shaw, James Joyce can be cited as well as 
an example of a comic figure who, through satire, stimulated the debate 
for the building of a culture. As Niall Sheridan recalled in Myles. Portraits 
of Brian O’Nolan (O’Keeffe 1973, 32), Joyce himself said that most critics 
failed to appreciate his Ulysses for what it really was, a “funny book” (ibidem, 
49). Funny it was indeed, so profoundly funny that it unsettled many con-
ventional views on literature, society, and maybe the very mindset of many. 
Brian O’Nolan loved the master for this reason, as John McCourt remarks 
in “Myles na gCopaleen. A portrait of the artist as a Joyce scholar”: “What 
most appealed to O’Nolan was, very simply, Joyce’s humour and his ‘almost 
supernatural skill in conveying Dublin dialogue’. However, like many other 
supporters, he remained disenchanted with much of the later part of Ulysses 
and with all of Finnegans Wake” (McCourt 2014, 112).
And he also went so far as to write in 1962 to the Irish Times, as Flann 
O’Brien, to complain about the unreadability of the latter book by the common 
reader, and to let other readers know that he himself had bought a copy and 
“given it away within a fortnight” (cited in ibidem). On top of that, he surely 
envied his fame and had different ideas on novel writing, while the American 
academia who jumped in the wake probably irritated him, because he might 
have felt that foreigners were appropriating a national glory. Nonetheless, the 
Great Exile remained a touchstone for Irish writers and for him in particular:
He admired the Joyce who challenged the stultifying political and religious 
status quo in Ireland, whose writings engaged with and put it up to, “the Plain 
People of Ireland”, of whom, in many ways, Myles always felt he was a member. …
For all his annoyance and perhaps envy at all the attention Joyce was receiv-
ing, O’Nolan greatly identified with the older writer’s use of humour and parody 
which was used with such great effect to undermine Irish pieties. (Ibidem, 122-123)
Kiberd summarized this complex relationship with a catchy formula:
The problem of language confronting an Irish author in English had not changed 
all that greatly since the time of Joyce. It might be summed up in the fact that all 
of O’Brien debunking of Joyce were parodies of a parody, since there was no defini-
tively Joycean style. (2000, 507-508)
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However, as already mentioned, comic figures build and do not de-
stroy. If a comic debunks and shatters something to pieces, it is always with 
a purpose. It can vary from one case to another, but in general, their purpose 
is to build a common framework with the audience, in which to play with 
language and culture and to explore, safely, possibilities of reality. That is, a 
culture in common.
4. Building a culture in common
It is universally acknowledged that a single man cannot be many a man. 
Carol Taaffe says of O’Nolan that his “humour spiralled from the erudite and 
the ordinary, scolding the Plain People of Ireland while very much remain-
ing a part of their world. There is not much else like it” (Taaffe 2008, 207).
Brian O’Nolan is difficult to treat critically for various reasons, namely, 
the many pen names he adopted in his life as a journalist and writer. Even 
if from the very start some critics called him by his real name (in the several 
variants, Brian Nolan, Brian O’Nolan, Brian Ó Nualláin) there have always 
also been those who preferred to relate to one or the other of his celebrity per-
sonas, Flann O’Brien or Myles na gCopaleen / na Gopaleen). The ambiguity 
was created by the author himself, to be sure, and he was almost delighted 
that many failed to recognize him as the man behind Myles or Flann. But 
once we are certain that the author is dead – and we are – there is no point 
in keeping up this distinction. In recent years, a number of studies have been 
published mixing contents in which Brian O’Nolan was recognized as such, 
with titles featuring his most famous pen names of Myles and Flann to at-
tract attention (Taaffe 2008; Borg, Fagan, Huber 2014). Of course, there 
are understandable publishers’ reasons, but it is time for literary criticism to 
make a step further and speak of Brian O’Nolan, the author.
This is particularly important in my view since, as the first section on 
the theories of humour attempted to point out, comic figures function as 
essential social connectors, invested with key responsibilities in maintain-
ing society’s cohesion. Using different pen names is only part of the strategy 
and the reason for it, given the premises, is quite clear: the humorist wants 
to create multiple identities to survive as long as possible and acquire a sta-
ble status in society. Normally, comic figures are not allowed this – except 
jesters, although at the same time they were hated for their privileges – but 
O’Nolan felt that modern mass communications society could now provide 
comic figures at a distance from the centre of attention from where to con-
tinue provoking conventions and testing alternative realities.
The context was favourable: the civil war in Ireland ended formally in 
1922, when he was eleven, and then the new constitution and the country’s 
neutrality in the Second World War kept a relative peace at home. His civil 
service employment secured a fixed income, a thing not to underestimate 
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in those years, so he had his back covered. He started writing as a journal-
ist and it was a beginning full of great expectations, but his first novel, At 
Swim-Two-Birds, published in 1939, was not a success in terms of sales. The 
second, The Third Policeman, was bluntly rejected by the publisher and lit-
erally put in a drawer for the rest of his life. He still had his column, which, 
amidst highs and lows, he kept for twenty-five years until the very day of 
his death, on 1 April 1966. He signed his novels as Flann O’Brien and his 
most famous column as Myles na Gopaleen, neither of them his real name, 
not counting the many other pseudonyms he used for other columns in na-
tional newspapers. But of course he was behind these writings (vouchsafing 
also what Niall Montgomery ghost-wrote for him, cf. Taaffe 2008), and the 
framework was one and only.
As already mentioned, the only strategy possible for anyone engaging 
in the difficult craft of making people laugh through humour, is not to ag-
gress (as Bergson would say) but to show them that the world is more than 
the current pattern of paramount reality, and that new ideas coming to the 
surface during the designated appearances of the finite provinces of mean-
ing could change it. Such was Brian O’Nolan’s strategy: taken together, all 
columns offer themselves to us at first sight as a bunch of funny sketches. At 
a closer look, some of them are not at all so; on the contrary, they are pretty 
rough in tone, thought-provoking, revolutionary. At the beginning of 1953, 
Myles attacked Andrew Clarkin, mayor of Dublin, about his shop’s broken 
clock (he called the article series ACCISS, for Andy Clarkin’s Clock Is Still 
Stopped), and one year later resumed the point to further explore his mis-
sion as a writer:
I KEEP evading the point. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance, as a tyrant 
once said. I confess that I have been myself too remiss and facetious in the past. 
Jokes are jokes, and they are necessary —just like occasional hysteria in women. 
But it is wrong for even a professional comic to turn away from contemporary de-
composition of civilization and society.
The column I run here — it runs me, to some extent— is the best in the whole 
world. I mutilate grammar to say that I intend to improve the best by making it bet-
ter. Ultimately it may be our simple boast that the stuff is good. In old age, a senile 
blush may welcome the assurance of a young caller that it is “fair.” We won’t go into 
the value of the compliment where the word “bad” is mentioned.
* * *
We are going to be more serious in the future. Do you think, reader, it is infan-
tile —this belated resolution to change the world? What else is there left to change?
(If that slurred sound I half-heard was the word “ME,” I will have the blood 
of the speaker!). (O’Nolan 1964) 
Not the funniest, I agree. But the truest, maybe. After 14 years of mostly 
entertaining columns, this one hit serious problems and revealed the writer’s 
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propositions. Its point of departure is a trifling one (the broken clock), but 
what it says on its way is dangerous enough: Brian O’Nolan (and not his 
personas) was indeed forced to retire from the civil service in 1953, curious-
ly immediately after the ACCISS affair. This series criticized things, people, 
customs, even alliances (with the US), trying to maintain a playful tone en 
passant. Of course, the risk was of not being funny, but the Plain People had 
to get the chance to see a possible, alternative future.
This to me is a confirmation of Brian O’Nolan’s idea of being a writer: 
he was serving his country, both with his daytime job as a civil servant and 
in the papers as a ‘hackney journalist’ – as he dubbed his Myles persona. Giv-
ing readers hints for reflection was and still is the most dangerous thing to 
do in a very controlled country – and Ireland was one, if we are not to pre-
tend that the reference to a tyrant was simply casual, given his long-running 
antipathy for the party system. In this “Brother” incipit, O’Nolan describes 
how the Plain People generally saw politics at the time of De Valera (whom 
he dubbed “Dev”), i.e., as a shady environment where everything important 
is discussed in guilty nightly meetings. The People, now like then, seem to 
know it instinctively and to have mixed feelings of complaint and admiration:
The brother is thinkin of goin up.
Going up what?
The brother is thinkin of standin.
Standing what? Drinks?
The brother is thinkin of having a go at the big parties.
Do you mean that your relative is considering offering himself as a candidate when 
a general election becomes due by reason of constitutional requirement?
The brother is thinkin of goin up at the elections.
I see.
Of course it’s not the brother himself that is all mad for this game. He’s bein 
pushed do you understand me. Certain influential parties is behind him. They’re 
night and mornin’ callin’ to the digs and colloguin with the brother inside in the 
back-room with the brother giving orders for tea to be made at wan in the mornin’. 
Any amount of fat oul’ fellas with the belly well out in front, substantial cattle-men 
be the look of them. No shortage of the ready there. (O’Nolan 1993, 58)
Being a literary humourist, as we have seen, forces the author to search 
for new material outside the proper domain of literature to establish un-
expected connections and elicit laughter. As a matter of fact, many critics 
correctly underlined O’Nolan’s interest in science, pataphysics, philosophy, 
religion, international relations and politics. The reason for this wide-ranging 
esprit, given our premises, becomes quite obvious in the light of the fact that 
keeping a strict ‘literary’ profile would have exhausted his creative force very 
soon, while cross-domain expansions and connections allowed for an oth-
erwise unreachable creativity and possibility for humour. This is why critics 
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have always had problems in categorizing Brian O’Nolan. Strictly speaking, 
he might be included both in Modernism and Post-Modernism, as Keith 
Hopper argued in his Flann O’Brien. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Post-
Modernist (1995) and in his essay on “John Duffy’s Brother”:
It seems to me that Flann O’Brien’s particular brand of post-modernism needs 
to be understood in two interrelated contexts: in an aesthetic domain (a challenge 
to the conceits of high modernism); and in an ethical domain (a resistance to the 
nativist and Catholic hegemony of post-colonial Ireland). (Hopper 2014, 27)
Marion Quirici, in the same collection with a piece on the use of frame 
device in O’Nolan’s short fiction, also notes that he possesses some of the 
qualities normally assigned to post-modernism:
the only thing being exposed here [in “Two in One”] is the construction of 
the story itself: the naked story does not hide the conventions of its own manufac-
turing …
As his puns and purposeful misspellings in “Cruiskeen Lawn” attest, the fail-
ure of language can give rise to fresh meanings and can be a means of subverting 
the “mortified language” of clichés. (O’Nolan 1993, 227)
If the limitations of language can be exploited to creative ends, so can the limi-
tations of the frame. (Quirici 2014, 49-50)
Both of these sound convincing, but I prefer to widen the scope in order 
to include the later novels, which are more conventional and less experimen-
tal as regards points of view, reliability of the narrator and, yes, humour as 
a destructive force; and to include the whole of his journalistic production 
otherwise neglected, a mass of more than two million words, outnumbering 
by far the books he wrote. It is not just a question of quantity, it is the qual-
ity of these writings that places them in the (again, very Irish) tradition of 
life writing, even if of fictional lives. In a sense, the very telling of invented 
life episodes involving Myles and many other characters makes this a long 
narrative, a story fragmented just like real life and collected to make up a 
new novel deserving to be included in his corpus. Ruben Borg, Paul Fagan 
and Werner Huber, editors of the most recent volume on the author, Flann 
O’Brien. Contesting Legacies (2014), in the “Introduction” to the volume put 
it in an interrogative way:
What if, rather than the ruination of his immense talent in subservience to an 
inferior medium, the “Cruiskeen Lawn” columns represent O’Nolan’s great mod-
ernist magnum opus in that most Benjaminian site of modernity, the newspaper? 
What if, rather than a minor, if funny, bald parody of Peig and An t-Oileánach, 
Myles na gCopaleen’s An Béal Bocht deserves acknowledgement for the subtlety of 
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its nuanced cultural critiques, the innovation of its compositional strategies and the 
fullness of its achievement beside Flann O’Brien’s more established novels? What 
if long-standing views of O’Nolan’s position on the spectrum from parochial con-
servatism to international experimentalism are complicated by the rich expanses of 
largely uncollected experimental Gaelic texts, from the anarchic tales and columns 
that he contributed to Eamon de Valera’s Irish Press to the predominantly Gaelic 
first years of “Cruiskeen Lawn”? (Ibidem, 5)
Indeed, this is not a new idea. Stephen Young had already supported it 
in his essay “Fact/Fiction: ‘Cruiskeen Lawn’, 1945-46”. With respect to the 
journalistic period of O’Nolan, he comments: “I think this enormous work 
should be recognised as a new kind of satire, perhaps even as a new kind 
of novel” (Young 1997, 118). John Wyse Jackson, too, who edited two col-
lections of Brian O’Nolan’s articles (Myles before Myles, 1988, and At War, 
1999), recalls that he “began to think of ‘Cruiskeen Lawn’ as some uniden-
tified subspecies of the fiction family, a random, episodic, wildly innocent 
rough beast of a ‘novel’, in which the novel form itself has been stretched to 
screaming point and beyond” (O’Brien 2003, 11).
If readers and critics had noticed this unity of intents in Brian O’Nolan’s 
lifetime, it would have been dangerous for him. Because, as he wrote in 1964 
(as Myles) in a famous autobiographical piece, being credited with fixed at-
titudes is the worst danger for a writer, and even more so for a humourist:
Apart from a thorough education of the widest kind, a contender in this field 
[literature] must have an equable yet versatile temperament, and the compart-
mentation of his personality for the purpose of literary utterance ensures that the 
fundamental individual will not be credited with a certain way of thinking, fixed 
attitudes, irreversible techniques of expression. No author should write under his 
own name nor under one permanent pen-name; a male writer should include in his 
impostures a female pen-name, and possibly vice versa. (Cited in Cronin 1990, 247; 
originally in O’Nolan 1964)
I believe that we can certainly consider “Cruiskeen Lawn” as an integral 
part of Brian O’Nolan’s opus. The reasons put forward by O’Nolan’s critics 
are certainly valuable but, formally, I reckon that Bakhtin’s and Eco’s defini-
tions of novel, postmodernity and the comic are what make for a definitive 
classification of O’Nolan’s journalism in the category of the novel.
Bakhtin, in his essay on epic and the novel, identifies the foundational 
features of the novel itself:
I find three basic characteristics that fundamentally distinguish the nov-
el in principle from other genres: 1) its stylistic three-dimensionality, which is 
linked with the multi-languaged consciousness realized in the novel; 2) the radi-
cal change it effects in the temporal coordinates of the literary image; 3) the new 
zone opened by the novel for structuring literary images, namely, the zone of 
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maximal contact with the present (with contemporary reality) in all its openend-
edness. (Bakhtin 1981, 11)
They almost seem taken straight out of a case study on O’Nolan. They 
are striking to the point of needing no additions, so well do they depict our 
journalist’s condition.
Eco, on the other hand, in his essay on “The comic and the rule”, ob-
serves that, contrary to the common belief that comedy is linked only to 
contemporaneity while tragedy is universal and a-temporal, the real differ-
ence is that the moral universe in a comedy is implicitly shared between the 
author and the audience, and there is no need to state it. Only when the au-
thor is unobtrusive can the spectator actively collaborate in the construction 
of new meaning. On the other hand, a ‘serious’ work of art such as a tragedy, 
normally explicitly contains its moral universe of reference: in this case, the 
author is not in search of collaboration but imposes his world view on the 
audience, and exactly for this reason viewers cannot bisociate but only asso-
ciate the elements proposed to their corresponding places in the framework 
of reference. Humour generates only when we actively do something, only 
when we create our new references, our new bisociations (Eco 2014, 269 ff.). 
O’Nolan makes wide use of traditional storytelling techniques as he 
tries to engage his audience by constantly reclaiming attention, prompting 
responses, recovering the story’s thread (for those who got distracted or were 
absent), or challenging the belief of his readers/listeners with openings like 
the opening epigraph of At Swim-Two-Birds: “All the characters represented 
in this book, / including the first person singular, / are entirely fictitious and 
bear no relation / to any person living or dead” (O’Brien 2001, 7).
Maybe these very techniques are what suggested his possible belonging 
to an avant-garde postmodernism, because of their jumping in and out of the 
literary conventions. He actually starts sometimes as if he were interrupting 
something else he was doing, and finishes to converse with an imaginary au-
dience, mimicking real-life storytelling environments (and creating, again, 
another finite province of meaning):
Dog bites man. O.K., we know that ain’t news, no good newspaper man would 
try to make a story out of that. But man bites hot-dog, is that news? Man chas-
es cat, is that news? Well-known dog elected to Board of Bank of Ireland, is that 
news? Puce-faced usurer fights ferret, how about that? If over-zealous Customs men 
at Dundalk insist on searching the bags under your eyes, is that news? If ebullient 
zestful Myles na gCopaleen quips in Dublin’s swish uptown Shelbourne Hotel that 
the Americans and Japs are “Pacifists”, is that news? JOCKEY RIDES STRAIGHT 
RACE AND DOES HIS BEST TO WIN! Would ace-reporter Clark Gable tear 
out the front page for that and hold everything for a re-plate?
The word “news” is composed of the initials of north, east, west, and south – 
news from all quarters, see, STOP THAT!
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The Plain People of Ireland: What?
Myself: Biting your nails.
The Plain People of Ireland: Sorry. (O’Brien 2003, 55-56)
As Ceccarelli said, treating words like things is a natural human activity 
and is what comic figures do most of the time. What we call pun, or play on 
words, or satire, or irony, draw on the basic mechanism of unlocking words 
from their encrusted meaning and placing them in completely different set-
tings and situations, digging their literal meanings, playing with sounds and 
spellings: this is the radical unsettling that opens up the doors of the finite 
provinces of meaning, where we can eventually do whatever we want without 
worrying too much about the consequences. Calling Brian O’Nolan a con-
spirator, then, to me is awarding him the role of captain player, the one who 
sets the rules by breaking the rules of paramount reality, so that others can 
play at reorganizing them. The building of a culture in common owes much 
to humour for the possibilities it creates, and we must only thank comic fig-
ures like Brian O’Nolan who mastered language and literature for the wid-
est public to engage in this foundational social activity.
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